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Abstract
A fancy learning algorithm A outperforms
a baseline method B when they are both
trained on the same data. Should A get all
of the credit for the improved performance
or does the training data also deserve some
credit? When deployed in a new setting
from a different domain, however, A makes
more mistakes than B. How much of the
blame should go to the learning algorithm or
the training data? Such questions are be-
coming increasingly important and prevalent
as we aim to make ML more accountable.
Their answers would also help us allocate re-
sources between algorithm design and data
collection. In this paper, we formalize these
questions and provide a principled Extended
Shapley framework to jointly quantify the
contribution of the learning algorithm and
training data. Extended Shapley uniquely
satisfies several natural properties that en-
sure equitable treatment of data and algo-
rithm. Through experiments and theoreti-
cal analysis, we demonstrate that Extended
Shapley has several important applications:
1) it provides a new metric of ML perfor-
mance improvement that disentangles the in-
fluence of the data regime and the algorithm;
2) it facilitates ML accountability by prop-
erly assigning responsibility for mistakes; 3)
it provides more robustness to manipulation
by the ML designer.
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1 Introduction
In machine learning (ML), the standard way to evalu-
ate a new learning algorithm A is to compare its per-
formance with the performance of a baseline algorithm
B, when A and B are trained on the same dataset D.
For example, if A and B achieves 0.9 and 0.7 accuracy,
then papers typically report that A is better than B
by 0.2. Implicit in this ubiquitous practice is the as-
sumption that A itself is solely responsible for all of the
difference in performance. Is this always a reasonable
assumption? Could the training data D also deserve
some of the credit for the improvement?
Taking this example one step further, suppose A and
B are deployed in a new setting, which may not be
identical to the training distribution, and the new ac-
curacies drop to 0.5 and 0.7 respectively. Is the learn-
ing algorithm A now entirely to be blamed for the 0.2
performance gap here? Perhaps some of the responsi-
bility lay with the training data D as well.
How to quantify and assign credit for learning algo-
rithms is an foundational component towards making
ML more accountable, fair and transparent. This is an
increasingly important question especially as learning
algorithms are increasingly wide-spread and regulated.
However this question has not been rigorously stud-
ied. In this paper, we develop a principled Extended
Shapley framework to jointly model and quantify the
contributions of the training data and the learning al-
gorithm. Our Extended Shapley uniquely satisfies sev-
eral desirable fairness properties. We derive analyti-
cal characterizations of the value of the ML designer
and the value of individual training datum. And we
demonstrate how this framework naturally addresses
the questions posed above: the value of the ML de-
signer in Extended Shapley quantifies how much of the
improvement or drop in performance (compared to a
baseline) it is responsible for. This provides a new
metric to assess the progress made by new learning al-
gorithms and it also gives insights into how algorithm’s
value depends on the data distribution.
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Related work Shapley value was proposed in a clas-
sic paper in game theory [23]. It has been applied to
analyze and model diverse problems including voting
and bargaining [20, 10]. Recent works have adopted
Shapley values to quantify the contribution of data in
ML tasks [9, 12, 1]. However in these settings, the
ML algorithm is assumed to be given and the focus
is purely on the data value. In contrast, in our ex-
tended Shapley framework, we jointly model the con-
tribution of both the learning algorithm and the data.
Shapley value has also been used in a very different
ML context as a feature importance score to interpret
black-box predictive models [21, 14, 6, 17, 5, 8, 4, 16].
Their goal is to quantify, for a given prediction, which
features are the most influential for the model output.
There is also a literature in estimating Shapley value
using Monte Carlo methods, network approximations,
as well as analytically solving Shapley value in special-
ized settings [7, 19, 3, 18, 11].
Algorithmic accountability is an important step to-
wards making ML more fair and transparent [28].
However there has been relatively little work on quan-
titative metrics of accountability. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that jointly quanti-
fies the contribution of training data and the learning
algorithm in ML.
2 Jointly modeling the contribution of
data and algorithm
2.1 Data valuation
Recent works studied how to quantify the value of the
individual training datum for a fixed ML model [9].
In the data valuation setting, we are given a train-
ing set N = {z1, ..., zn} of n data points and we have
a fixed learning algorithm A1. A can be trained on
any subset S ⊆ N and produces a predictor A(S).
The performance of A(S) is quantified by a particu-
lar metric—e.g. accuracy, F1, etc.—evaluated on the
test data, and we denote this as vA(S). More formally,
G ≡ {v : 2N → R such that v(∅) = 0} denote the
space of performance functions and vA ∈ G. The al-
gorithm’s overall performance is vA(N) and the goal
of data valuation is to partition vA(N) among i ∈ N .
By drawing an analogy to the classic Shapley value in
cooperative game theory [23, 24], it turns out that that
there is a unique data valuation scheme, φ : G→ Rn,
that satisfies four reasonable equitability principles:
S1. Null player: If i ∈ N is a null player in v—i.e.
v(S + i) = v(S) ∀S ⊆ N − i—then φi(v) = 0.
1We will often denote zi by its index i to simplify nota-
tion.
S2. Linearity: If v1, v2 ∈ G are two performance func-
tions, then φ(v1 + v2) = φ(v1) + φ(v2).
S3. Efficiency:
∑
i∈N φi(v) = v(N).
S4. Symmetry: If i, j ∈ N are identical in v—i.e.
v(S + i) = v(S + j) ∀S ⊆ N − {i, j}—then
φi(v) = φj(v).
This unique data Shapley value is given by:
φi(v) =
∑
S⊂N−i
τS,N · [v(S + i)− v(S)] (1)
where φi denote the value of the i-th training point
and τS,N =
|S|!(|N |−|S|−1)!
|N |! is a weighting term [9].
2.2 Extended Shapley for data and learning
algorithm
While the data Shapley of Eqn. 1 is useful—e.g. it
identifies poor quality data and can improve active
learning [9]—it implicitly assumes that all of the per-
formance is due to the training data, since
∑
i∈N φi =
vA(N). This data-centric view is limiting, since we
know that a good design of the learning algorithm
A can greatly improve performance, and hence A de-
serves some credit. Conversely, if A fails on a test
domain, then A should share some of the responsibil-
ity.
Much of ML takes the other extreme—the algorithm-
centric perspective—in assigning credit/responsibility.
Many ML papers present a new learning algorithm A
by showing a performance gap over a baseline algo-
rithm B on a standard dataset N . It is often framed
or implicitly assumed that the entire performance gap
is due to the higher quality of A over B. As we will
discuss, this algorithm centric perspective is also lim-
iting, since it completely ignores the contribution of
the training data in N to this performance gap.
In many real-world applications, we would like to
jointly model the value of the data and learning algo-
rithm. Training data takes time and resource to collect
and label. Developing an advanced algorithm tailored
for a particular dataset or task also requires time and
resource, and it can lead to a better outcome than just
using the off-the-shelf-method (e.g. a carefully archi-
tectured deep net vs. running scikit-learn SVM [22]
). Moreover, in many applications, the algorithm is
adaptively designed based on the data. Therefore it
makes sense to quantify the contribution of the data
and algorithm together.
First attempt at model To gain intuition as we
build up to our proposed solution, consider the follow-
ing naive extension of Data Shapley to this new setup:
explicitly add the algorithm A and B to the coalition
as the n+ 1-th and n+ 2 synthetic “data”. Then use
the Data Shapley as above (Equation 1) with respect
to the enlarged coalition and the following modified
value function for S ⊆ N + 2:
v′(S) =

0 A,B /∈ S
vA(S) A ∈ S,B /∈ S
vB(S) A /∈ S,B ∈ S
max{vA(S), vB(S)} A ∈ S,B ∈ S
(2)
where vA(S) and vB(S) are the performance of A,B
trained on S, respectively. However, this model
doesn’t capture our intuition that A is the new al-
gorithm that we want to evaluate and B is the off-
the-shelf benchmark. For example, suppose the ML
developer is lazy and provides a fancy algorithm A
which is exactly the same as B under-the-hood. Then
A and B would be completely symmetric in Eqn. 2,
and they would receive the same value (which could
be substantial) under Eqn. 1. In this case, the ML
developer would receive credit for doing absolutely no
work, which is undesirable.
Extended Shapley We now formally define our ex-
tended Shapley framework. We will build on the no-
tation set up in Section 2.1. Suppose we have a ML
designer who develops algorithm A and B denotes a
baseline ML model. For example, A could be a new
tailored-designed network and B is the off-the-shelf
SVM. Both A and B are trained on the dataset N .
Our goal is to jointly quantify the value of each da-
tum in N as well as the ML designer who proposes A.
Including the baseline B makes the framework more
flexible and captures more realistic settings.
Let vA, vB ∈ G denote the performances of A and B,
respectively. Denote v = (vA, vB) ∈ G×G ≡ G2. We
are interested in assigning value to both the datapoints
N and the ML designer for developing A instead of B.
That is, we are now looking for an extended valuation
function, ϕ : G2 → Rn+1. Note that ϕ is defined over
pairs of games, and that its’ range is in Rn+1. We
interpret ϕi(v) for i = 1, . . . , n as the value for a dat-
apoint i ∈ N and ϕn+1(v), sometimes denoted ϕA(v),
as the payoff for the ML designer. The setting is intrin-
sically asymmetric between A and B and we are not
interested in the value of the baseline. The inclusion
of the baseline gives us more modeling flexibility. For
example, if we are interested in the value of A without
comparing it to a baseline, we can always set vB = 0.
There are infinitely many possible valuation functions
ϕ. Following the approach of the original Shapley
value, we take an axiomatic approach by first laying
out a set of reasonable properties that we would like
an equitable valuation to satisfy, and then analyze the
resulting value.
3 Extended Shapley
We would like extended Shapley valuation ϕ to satisfy
the following properties, which are natural extensions
of the original Shapley axioms.
P1. Extended Null Player: If i ∈ N is a null player
in both vA, vB , then it should receive ϕi(v) = 0.
Additionally, if A is identical to the benchmark
B—i.e. vA(S) = vB(S) ∀S ⊆ N—the designer
should receive ϕn+1(v) = 0.
P2. Linearity: Let vA1, vA2, vB1, vB2 ∈ G be any four
performance functions. Then, ϕ(vA1 + vA2, vB) =
ϕ(vA1, vB) + ϕ(vA2, vB); similarly, ϕ(vA, vB1 +
vB2) = ϕ(vA, vB1) + ϕ(vA, vB2).
P3. Efficiency w.r.t vA: ϕA(v)+
∑
i∈N ϕi(v) = vA(N).
P4. Symmetry between data: If i, j ∈ N are identical
in both vA, vB , then ϕi(v) = ϕj(v).
P5. Equitability between data and algorithm: if
adding i ∈ N and adding A have the same effect—
i.e. ∀S ⊆ N − i, vB(S + i) = VA(S)—then
ϕi(v) = ϕA(v).
P1 to P4 are direct analogues of the fundamental fair-
ness axioms of the Shapley value and the data Shapley
value. P5 is also a reasonable property that ensures
that the algorithm and data get the same value if they
have the same effect. It might be helpful to think of
the extreme case where A is simply adding another
datum zA to the training set and then apply B. In
this case, P5 is equivalent to P4.
Proposition 3.1. There is a unique valuation ϕ :
G2 → Rn+1 that satisfies P1 to P5, and it is given
by
ϕA(v) =
∑
S⊆N
S!(N − S)!
(N + 1)!
[vA(S)− vB(S)] (3)
and
ϕi(v) =
∑
S⊆N−i
wS,N · τS,N · [vA(S + i)− vA(S)]
+
∑
S⊆N−i
(1− wS,N ) τS,N · [vB(S + i)− vB(S)] (4)
where wa,b =
a+1
b+1 . We call ϕA, ϕi the Extended Shap-
ley values.
Proof. Please see Appendix A for the proof.
Each of the properties P1 to P5 is necessary to ensure
the uniqueness of the valuation ϕ. In Eqn. 3, the coef-
ficient is |S|!(N−|S|)!(N+1)! =
1
N+1 ·
(
N
|S|
)−1
. Thus intuitively,
instead of simply comparing the difference in the two
algorithms’ overall performance vA(N) − vB(N), Ex-
tended Shapley considers the difference vA(S)−vB(S),
where S is chosen randomly as follows: first a set size
k is chosen uniformly at random from 0 to N , and then
a random subset S ⊆ N of that size is chosen.
In Eqn. 4, if it weren’t for the additional weight terms
w and (1−w), the term on the left would be identical
to the payoff of i under Data Shapley w.r.t A and the
term on the right would be the payoff of i under Data
Shapley w.r.t B. Thus, one way of interpreting these
two quantities is as variants of the Shapley payoff that
adjusts the importance of subsets according to their
size: since wa,b → 1 as a → b, the expression on the
left down-weights the importance ofthe marginal con-
tribution of i to smaller subsets S ⊂ N− i whereas the
expression on the right down-weights the importance
of the marginal contribution of i to larger subsets.
We can provide a different view of the ML designer’s
value under Extended Shapley, that is related to the
notion of leave-one-out stability.
Lemma 3.2. For a game v ∈ G, define v ∈ G as
follows:
v(S) =
∑
i∈N−S
[v(S + i)− v(S)]
The value of the ML designer under Extended Shapley
can also be written as
ϕA(v) =
∑
S⊆N
S!(N − S)!
(N + 1)!
[vA(S)− vB(S)]
In some cases, the view of A’s value in Lemma 3.2
can provide a upper bound on ϕA(v) without directly
computing the expression in Eqn. 3.
Lemma 3.3. If A,B are γ-leave-one-out-stable w.r.t
the performance metric v, i.e., for both A and B
max
S⊆N,i∈N
|v(S + i)− v(S)| ≤ γ
Then ϕA(v) ≤ n · γ/2.
The proof can be found in the Appendix A. The fol-
lowing example demonstrates that the upper-bound is
tight.
Example 3.4. Suppose that A and B are given by
vA(S) = |S| and vB(S) ≡ 0. In this case, the value of
A under Extended Shapley is exactly n2 :
ϕA(v) =
∑
S⊆N
τS,N+1 · [vA(S)− vB(S)]
=
∑
S⊆N
τS,N+1 · vA(S) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
τS,N+1 · k
=
n∑
k=0
k
n+ 1
=
n
2
Note that this is exactly the upper-bound from Lemma
3.3, since A is γ = 1 stable and B is γ = 0 stable.
In general, while computing the Extended Shapley val-
ues in Eqn. 3, 4 are expensive, we can efficiently esti-
mate them with Monte Carlo approximations [9].
4 Experiments and Applications of
Extended Shapley
With the definition and charectarizations of Extended
Shapley in place, we highlight several benefits and ap-
plications of jointly accounting for the value of the
algorithm and the data points.
4.1 Measuring algorithmic performance
In the following experiments, we apply the Extended
Shapley framework in several settings. Computing the
exact Shapley values requires exponentially large num-
ber of computations in N and therefore we use the
TMC-Shapley Monte-Carlo approximation algorithm
introduced in previous work [9].
How algorithm’s value depends on the data dis-
tribution We begin our experiments by applying
Extended Shapley to a simple but illuminating setting
where A is a nearest neighbor classifier. We will see
that Extended Shapley provides interesting insights
into the way the algorithm’s value depends on the data
distribution and the algorithm itself.
For simplicity, the N data points are scalars uniformly
sampled from [0, 1] and are assigned a label using a bi-
nary labeling function. The labeling function divides
the interval [0, 1] into several sub-intervals. Points in
each sub-interval is assigned one of the two labels, and
the adjacent intervals are assigned the opposite label,
and so on. The sub-intervals are randomly chosen
such that the resulting labeling function is balanced;
i.e. sub-intervals of each label will cover half of [0, 1]
(Fig. 1(c)). A is a simple kNN (k-nearest neighbors)
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Figure 1: Extended shapley (a) The 3NN algorithm is applied to binary classification problems with
various levels of difficulty. Using 300 training points, the algorithm achieves the same performance
level on all datasets. Meanwhile, it has a smaller Shapley value w.r.t. the Majority Vote benchmark
(area between the curves and the grey line) as the dataset increases in difficulty (the # of intervals
increases). (b) Different algorithms applied to the same binary classification problem with 8 intervals.
Given 300 training points, all of them have the same test performance while 1NN has the highest
Shapley value. (c) Two different algorithm (1NN and 3NN) applied to the same binary classification
problem (each color represents one of the labels). The Extended Shapley value of the data points
tend to be higher near the interval boundaries. In (a) and (b), the shaded areas stand for standard
deviation of 10 different runs of the experiment.
algorithm. The benchmarkB is a simple majority-vote
classifier that assigns the same label to all of the test
data points. The performance of A and B is evaluated
on a balanced test set sampled from the same distribu-
tion. As the labeling function is balanced, vB(S) = 0.5
for S ⊆ N . An version of this problem corresponds to
a choice of a labeling function.
We first show how the value of A under Extended
Shapley depends on the data distribution. In Fig. 1(a),
we apply 3NN on N = 300 training points. There are
4 versions of the data distribution, corresponding to
2,4,8 and 16 intervals. As the number of intervals in-
creases, the data distribution becomes harder for the
3NN algorithm. The majority vote baseline achieves
0.5 accuracy in all the versions. Each curve in Fig. 1(a)
plots the vA(S) averaged across the subsets S of the
same cardinality (shown on the x-axis). The Extended
Shapley value of A, according to Eqn. 3, is exactly the
area between the performance curve and the Major-
ity Vote baseline. On the whole dataset N , the fi-
nal performance vA(N) is the same across all the data
versions. Interestingly, the value of A decreases as the
number of intervals increase. This reflects the intuition
that the 3NN extracts less useful information when the
neighbors have more alternating labels.
Next we consider the complementary setting where we
fix a version of the data distribution with 8 intervals,
and apply several kNNs for k = 1, 3, 5 (Fig. 1(b)). Here
the different kNNs all of the same final performance
vA(N) on the full data N . However, the value of A
decreases as k increases. This is interesting because
when the data has 8 intervals, using more neighbors is
noisier especially for smaller training size.
Finally we investigate the Extended Shapley value of
individual data points. We fix a particular version with
6 intervals and applied 1NN and 3NN in this setting
(Fig. 1(c)). For each given data point, we create a
data set of size 200 by sampling 199 data points of the
same distribution and compute its value in that data
set. We repeat this process 100 times and take the
average value of that point. The individual data values
are plotted in the bottom two panels of Fig. 1(c). The
Extended Shapley data values are higher closer to the
interval boundaries, as those points are informative.
The data values for 3NN is overall slightly higher than
for 1NN. The 3NN values are noisier since points in one
interval (esp. near the boundary) can lead to mistakes
in the adjacent interval when chosen as neighbors.
Performance versus Extended Shapley value
As a real-world example, we compare the performance
and the Extended Shapley value of two different algo-
rithms for the problem of disease prediction. The task
is to predict whether given an individual’s phenotypic
data, they will be diagnosed with a certain disease in
the future. We worked three problems, predicting ma-
Breast Cancer Lung Cancer Ovary Cancer
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Shapley value of disease prediction algorithms For a training data set of size 1000:
(a) The algorithm that has a better test performance (random forest) is also the one with a higher
value. (b) Both algorithms have the same performance while having different Shapley values. (c) The
algorithm with the better performance (logistic regression) is the one with a smaller Shapley value.
lignant neoplasms of breast, lung and ovary (ICD10
codes C50, C34, and C56) from the UK Biobank data
set [25]. For each disease we create a balanced train-
ing data set of 1000 individuals with half of them
diagnosed with the disease. We then compare the
value of two algorithms—logistic regression and ran-
dom forest—against the majority-vote benchmark B.
The three diseases illustrate three interesting scenar-
ios of how the Extended Shapley gives insights differ-
ent from simply comparing the overall model perfor-
mances (Fig. 2). For breast cancer prediction, the ran-
dom forest algorithm has a higher performance (70.5%
vs 68.5%) and a higher Extended Shapley value (0.194
vs 0.167). For lung cancer prediction, both algorithms
have almost the same performance (63.1% and 63.2%)
while random forest has a higher value (0.116 vs 0.101)
because it learns more from smaller subset of data.
Ovary cancer is a setting where the logistic regression
model, while having a better performance (71.9% vs
69.0%), has a lower Extended Shapley value (0.168 vs
0.179). This suggests that even though logistic regres-
sion achieves good final accuracy, the training data
itself deserves some of its credit, since the model per-
forms poorly on smaller subsets. A balanced test set
of size 500 was used to compute the value and perfor-
mance in all of the three problems.
Fair algorithm gets credit for reducing dispar-
ity It has been demonstrated that ML models per-
form poorly on dark-skinned women for detecting gen-
der from face images [2]. One way to compensate
for this problem is to increase the weight of the im-
ages in the minority subgroups in the cost function
of the learning algorithm. Following work in the lit-
erature [13], we use a set of 1000 images from the
LFW+A[27] data set that has an imbalanced represen-
tation of different subgroups (21% female, 5% black)
as our training data. The performance is measured
using the maximum disparity (difference in prediction
accuracy of different subgroups) on 800 images of the
PPB[2] data set; a data set designed to have equal
representation of sex and different skin colors. All
images are transformed into 128 dimensional features
by passing through a Inception-Resnet-V1[26] archi-
tecture pre-trained on the Celeb A[15] data set (more
than 200,000 face images). The benchmark B is a
logistic regression algorithm and A is a weighted logis-
tic regression algorithm where the weight for samples
of each subgroup is inversely proportional to the sub-
group size. A achieves a lower disparity of 18.1% while
B results in a 23.0% disparity (A also has a higher ac-
curacy of 93.7% vs 93.0%). The Shapley value of A
against the benchmark is 4.5%, almost equal to the
difference in the disparity (4.8%). This means that
most of the credit for the less biased performance goes
to the design of the fairness-aware algorithm A.
4.2 Algorithmic Accountability
Consider the following motivating scenario: a com-
pany develops a state-of-the-art classification algo-
rithm that is intended to identify individuals that re-
quire critical medical attention. Team 1 is in charge
of collecting and preparing appropriate datasets to
feed the ML model; Team 2 uses this data, as well as
their combination of technical and domain expertise,
to train the models. Some time after the product’s
Figure 3: Left: D ∼ DS (source) and DT ∼ DT (target); {+,−} represent {±1} labels and numbers
represent each colors’ fractional mass. Note that DS and DT differ only in that the labels of the green
points are flipped. Algorithms are trained on D, but are evaluated on DT . This causes the non-
linear classifier fA ← B(D) to under-perform relative to the benchmark linear classifier fB ← B(D):
vA(D) = 0.8 < 1.0 = vB(D). Right: A comparison between evaluating the algorithm’s value using
Extended Shapley (blue) versus the marginal difference vA(N) − vB(N) (red), where the fractional
mass of the green points varies between 0.0 and 0.5. At x = 0 both lines start at ϕ = 0.0 since
without any mis-labeled examples, the linear and non-linear algorithms perform equally well. Note
that despite the similar shape, under Extended Shapley the algorithm’s value is much less negative,
suggesting that the issues with the data are largely accountable for the performance gap.
deployment, an independent investigation reveals that
there is a subpopulation of individuals for which the
deployed model provides near-meaningless predictions.
The company wants to understand why the product
fail in this way, and who’s responsible. While this is
clearly a toy example, it captures several characteris-
tics and challenges of ML accountability. The condi-
tions under which algorithms are eventually deployed
typically differ from those in which they were devel-
oped (e.g. domain adaptation). And when things do
go wrong, who’s to blame? This is not merely for
finger-pointing: it is a crucial part of the model devel-
opment process and “debugging” procedure. In this
section, we take a technical (and inherently narrow)
perspective to this broad question of accountability.
In particular, we explore the way Extended Shapley—
by explicitly quantifying the value of both the ML de-
signer and the data—may provide a means of disen-
tangling the effect of the algorithm choice (Team 2)
from the effect of the training data (Team 1).
We instantiate the motivating scenario as follows.
Suppose we have a source and a target distributions.
The source distribution DS is the distribution from
which a dataset D ∼ DS is sampled; this dataset will
be used to train all subsequent algorithms. A sec-
ond dataset is sampled from the target distribution
DT ∼ DT and used to evaluate deployment perfor-
mance; i.e., the metric v calculates some measure of
accuracy on DT . We assume that DS and DT differ
in that there is one sub-population whose labels are
incorrectly flipped in the source distribution; see Fig-
ure 3 for a visualization. As our benchmark B we take
the class of linear classifiers (hyperplanes). The ML
designer, on the other hand chooses to work with a
slightly more complex class: A is the intersection of
(up to) two hyperplanes. To simplify the problem, we
ignore issues of optimization and sample complexity
and assume that A and B can solve their respective
risk minimization problems exactly. We denote with
fA, fB the classifiers obtained by applying A (resp.,
B) on D.
As Figure 3 shows, the mislabeling of the subpopu-
lation in the source distribution (left) means that fA
actually under-performs relative to fB on DT (right).
A naive approach for attributing “blame” might con-
sider the marginal difference in performance of algo-
rithm A relative to the benchmark B: in this case,
vA(D) − vB(D) = 0.8 − 1.0 = −0.2. One way to in-
terpret this is that the ML designer’s choice of an “in-
correct” hypothesis class (non-linear classifiers) has a
cost of −0.2. However there is another source for the
gap in performance between A and B: the difference
in the source and target distributions (the mis-labeled
training points). Intuitively, if it were not for the pres-
ence of these erronously-labeled data points, A would
not have performed so poorly, and may have even per-
formed better. Therefore, it’s no longer clear that the
marginal difference of −0.2 is entirely A’s “fault”. The
right panel of Figure 3 demonstrates that Extended
Shapley indeed takes this into account, assigning A a
value that’s much less negative than −0.2. See Ap-
pendix B for a detailed description of the setup of this
experiment.
4.3 Robust Data Valuation
The regular data Shapley (Eqn. 1) is highly vulnerable
to attacks by the ML designer. We show that the ML
designer can manipulate the learning algorithm such
that the overall performance is unchanged but the data
Shapley value is substantially altered.
Example 4.1. Suppose that the ML designer has
some “favourite” point, which we denote as x? ∈ N .
We now show that for every algorithm A the ML de-
signer wishes to use, it can achieve identical perfor-
mance while guaranteeing that Data Shapley will al-
locate the payoffs strictly to x?. Indeed, define the
following variant of A that operates as follows:
∀S ⊆ N, A′(S) =
{
A(S) x? ∈ S
h x? /∈ S
where h is some fixed predictor, say h(x) ≡ 1.
Note that A′(N) ≡ A(N), so the overall performance
remained identical. However, under A′, the marginal
contribution of any point i 6= x? under any subset
S ⊂ N is zero. This implies that ϕi(v) = 0. From
efficiency, this also implies that ϕx?(v) = vA(N). In
others words, the ML designer’s favourite point is now
the sole receiver of the value. This example illustrates
how the Data Shapley value is vulnerable to adversar-
ial manipulations.
Intuitively, the construction in Example 4.1 exploits
the fact that Data Shapley assumes the algorithm it
evaluates is given as a black-box [9]. This might sug-
gest that a way of guaranteeing robustness to manipu-
lation would be to require the ML designer to commit
to a particular structural form (e.g., applying a certain
pre-processing procedure on the data and then fitting
logistic regression), and disclosing it to the party con-
ducting the data valuation. The requirement for full
disclosure of the model could be a hurdle to apply-
ing this approach in practical use-cases. But as we
demonstrate in the next example, even that does not
rule out every form of manipulation from the ML de-
signers’ side.
Example 4.2. Assume that now there is a subset of
points T ⊂ N belonging to a minority subpopulation,
which the ML designer wishes to down-weight their
value. The designer can now define (and disclose) A′
as follows: before applying A, remove from the train-
ing set points from subpopulations that have less than
|T |−1 examples. This form of pre-processing could be
justified for better generalization performance (e.g. as
a form of outlier removal), yet significantly hurts the
value of points in T : under A′, each i ∈ T only has
marginal contribution for subsets S ⊂ N that already
include the rest of T .
We claim that Extended Shapley provides a certain ro-
bustness to manipulations without knowing algorithm
A except that its performance doesn’t decrease when
given larger training set (which is often the case). In
particular, an immediate corollary of Proposition 3.1
implies the existence of a lower-bound on the payoff
assigned to each i ∈ N that’s independent of the ML
designer.
Corollary 4.3. The Shapley value of every i ∈ N
satisfies:
ϕi(v) ≥
∑
S⊂N−i
(1− wS,N ) τS,N · [vB(S + i)− vB(S)]
This highlights the benefit of measuring the perfor-
mance of A relative to a fixed benchmark B. In prac-
tical applications, this benchmark can be chosen by
the auditor conducting the data valuation; we there-
fore think of it as non-adversarial. This demonstrates
that for an appropriate benchmark model B, Extended
Shapley can more robustly account for the usefulness
of data than the regular data Shapley value.
5 Conclusions
Extended Shapley provides a principled framework to
jointly quantify the contribution of the learning algo-
rithm and training data to the overall models’ perfor-
mance. It’s a step in formalizing the notion of ML ac-
countability, which is increasingly important especially
as ML becomes more wide-spread in mission critical
applications. The strong axiomatic foundation of Ex-
tended Shapley guarantees equitable treatment of data
and algorithm. We have demonstrated that Extended
Shapley can be used in several important applications,
such as measuring progress in ML and assigning re-
sponsibility for failure cases. In these applications we
focused on using Extended Shapley as a diagnostics
tool, and it provides interesting insights into how al-
gorithm’s value depends on the training dataset. A
natural and interesting direction for future work is to
investigate the extent to which the insights that the
Shapley value provides can be used to improve perfor-
mance at test time. Another important direction of
future work is to generalize Extended Shapley to mul-
tiple algorithms and multiple benchmarks. This could
be useful in practice (when it’s not clear which single
algorithm should serve as the baseline) and also could
provide a way of strengthening the guarantees against
manipulation to the individual data points.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The proof of the proposition will consist of two parts:
first we define a valuation scheme and prove that it
satisfies P1-P5; then we will show that this valuation
scheme takes the form in the proposition statement.
Define ϕ : G2 → Rn+1 as follows:
ϕg(v) = ϕg(vA, vB) = φ
SHAP (v˜A,B)
where φSHAP is the regular Data Shapley and v˜A,B :
2N+1 → R : is defined as
v˜A,B(S) =
{
vA(S − {n+ 1}) n+ 1 ∈ S
vB(S) n+ 1 /∈ S
(5)
Recall that φSHAP satisfies S1-S4. We will now use
this to prove that ϕ : G2 → Rn+1 satisfies properties
P1-P5.
P1. First, assume i ∈ N is a null player in vA and
vB . We claim that this implies i is a null player in
the game v˜A,B . To show this, we must prove that
for every S ⊂ (N + 1) − i, v˜A,B(S + i) = v˜A,B(S).
Indeed: if the subset includes n + 1, the requirement
is equivalent to vA(S + i) = vA(S); if it doesn’t, the
requirement is equivalent to vB(S + i) = vB(S). In
either case the statement is true since i was assumed
to be a null player in both vA and vB . Thus from S1
we have that ϕi(v) = φi(v˜A,B) = 0. Finally, consider
n+ 1. Note that for any S ⊂ N , the requirement that
v˜(S + (n+ 1)) = v˜(S) is identical, by the definition of
v˜A,B , to vA(S) = vB(S). Thus the assumption of P1
means n + 1 is a null player in the game v˜A,B . From
S1 we therefore have that ϕn+1(v) = φn+1(v˜A,B) = 0,
as required.
P2. Suppose i, j are identical in both vA and vB ;
we will show that this means they are identical in the
game v˜A,B . Consider subsets of N+1−{i, j}. Suppose
a subset includes n + 1, then v˜(S + i) = v˜(S + j) is
equivalent to vA(S + i) = vA(S + j) and the later is
true since i, j are identical in vA. Similarly if the subset
doesn’t include n+ 1, this is equivalent to vB(S+ i) =
vB(S + j) which is true since i, j are identical in vB .
Thus from S2, we have that ϕi(v) = φi(v˜) = φj(v˜) =
ϕj(v).
P3. We will prove that ϕ is linear in its first compo-
nent; an identical argument can be used to show linear-
ity in the second. Let vA1, vA2, vB be any three games
in G. Note that v˜ satisfies: v˜A1+A2,B = v˜A1,B + v˜A2,B .
Thus from S3, φ(v˜A1+A2,B) = φ(v˜A1,B)+φ(v˜A1,B). We
therefore have that ϕ(vA1 + vA2, vB) = ϕ(vA1, vB) +
ϕ(vA2, vB), as required.
P4. ∑
i∈N+1
ϕi(v) =
∑
i∈N+1
φi(v˜A,B)
= v˜A,B(N + 1) = vA(N)
where the second transition is from S4 and the third
is directly by the definition of v˜A,B .
P5. Note that by the definition of v˜, vB(S+i) = vA(S)
is equivalent to v˜(S + i) = v˜(S + (n + 1)), for every
S ⊆ N − i. Then the assumption in this property
implies that n+1 and i are identical; from S2, we have
that ϕi(v) = φi(v˜) = φ(n+1)(v˜) = ϕA(v), as required.
We now turn to prove that the value assigned to the
algorithm and to the datapoints follow the expressions
in Equations 3 and 4. For the value of the algorithm,
this follows directly by applying the definition of the
Shapley value in the n+ 1 player game:
ϕA(v) = φ
SHAP
n+1 (v˜A,B)
=
∑
S⊆N
τS,N+1 · [v˜A,B(S + (n+ 1))− v˜A,B(S)]
=
∑
S⊆N
τS,N+1 · [vA(S)− vB(S)]
We now turn to proving Equation 4. First, to simplify
notation, we will use ∆v(S, i) to denote the marginal
difference of v evaluated on S + i versus S:
∆v(S, i) = v(S + i)− v(S)
By the definition of Extended Shapley,
ϕi(v) =
∑
S⊆N+1−i
τS,N+1 ·∆v˜A,B(S, i)
We now split this sum into two terms, those subsets
that include n+ 1 and those that don’t:∑
S⊆N+1−i
n+1∈S
τS,N+1∆v˜A,B(S, i)+
∑
S⊆N+1−i
n+1/∈S
τS,N+1∆v˜A,B(S, i)
and consider each term separately. For the term on
the right, note that iterating over subsets of N + 1− i
that don’t include n+ 1 is equivalent to iterating over
subsets of N − i, and that in this case v˜ is evaluated
as vB ; we can therefore re-write the term on the right
as:
∑
S⊆N−i
τS,N+1 ·∆vB(S, i) (6)
For the term on the left:∑
S⊆N+1−i
n+1∈S
τS,N+1 ·∆v˜A,B(S, i)
=
∑
S⊆N−i
S′←S+(n+1)
τS′,N+1 ·∆v˜A,B(S′, i)
=
∑
S⊆N−i
τS+1,N+1 ·∆vA(S, i)
Together, we have that that ϕi(v) can be written as
∑
S⊆N−i
τS+1,N+1 ·∆vA(S, i)+
∑
S⊆N−i
τS,N+1 ·∆vB(S, i)
The proof can be concluded by observing that
τS,N+1 = (1−wS,N ) ·τS,N and τS+1,N+1 = wS,N ·τS,N .
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
First, we note that by combining the efficiency axiom
with the charectarization of the previous proposition,
we can also write the ML designer’s value as
ϕA(v) =
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊂N−i
(1−wS,N )·τS,N ·[vA(S + i)− vA(S)]
−
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊂N−i
(1− wS,N ) · τS,N · [vB(S + i)− vB(S)]
To see this, first note that from the efficiency
property of Extended Shapley (P4),
∑
i∈N ϕi(v) +
ϕA(v) = vA(N). Additionally, from the effi-
ciency property of the standard Data Shapley (S4)
w.r.t A, vA(N) =
∑
i∈N ϕi(vA). Thus, ϕA(v) =∑
i∈N ϕi(vA) −
∑
i∈N ϕi(v). By the definition of the
Shapley value (Equation 1), the term on the left is∑
i∈N
∑
S⊂N−i τS,N ·∆vA(S, i). Now, by substituting
ϕi(v) with the expression for the value of the data-
points (Equation (4) and re-arranging, we get exactly
the above.
Next, we note that in general the sum
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N−i
is equivalent to the sum
∑
S⊆N
∑
i∈N−S . We can
therefore write:∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N−i
(1− wS,N )τS,N∆v(S, i)
=
∑
S⊆N
∑
i∈N−S
(1− wS,N )τS,N∆v(S, i)
=
∑
S⊆N
(1− wS,N )τS,N
∑
i∈N−S
∆v(S, i)
=
∑
S⊆N
(1− wS,N )τS,N · v(S)
Combining these two facts, we have:
ϕA(v) =
∑
S⊆N
(1− wS,N )τS,N [vA(S)− vB(S)]
The proof can be concluded by noting that (1−wS,N ·
τS,N = τS,N+1 =
S!(N−S)!
(N+1)! .
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3
The claim follows by proving that if v ∈ G is γ-stable
in the sense defined in the statement of the lemma,
then ∑
S⊆N
τS,N+1 · v(S) ≤ n
2
· γ
To prove this, we employ the second view of the ML
designer’s value from the previous lemma; in particu-
lar, it guarantees that∑
S⊆N
τS,N+1 · v(S) =
∑
S⊆N
τS,N+1v(S)
Which we can simplify as follows:∑
S⊆N
τS,N+1v(S)
=
∑
S⊆N
τS,N+1
∑
i∈N−S
[v(S + i)− v(S)]
≤
∑
S⊆N
τS,N+1
∑
i∈N−S
γ
=
∑
S⊆N
τS,N+1 |N − S| · γ
= γ ·
∑
S⊆N
τS,N+1 |N − S|
= γ
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
τS,N+1(n− k)
= γ
n∑
k=0
n− k
n+ 1
= γ
n(n+ 1)
2(n+ 1)
=
n
2
· γ
Together, we can conclude the required.
B Details of the experiments in
Section 4.2
Every point in the graph on the right hand side of Fig-
ure 3 corresponds to a problem instance as illustrated
in Figure 4. We now describe how we compute the
Figure 4: A problem instance is defined by pg, the fractional mass of the green points. They are
mis-labeled: in the source distribution their label is −, yet in the target distribution it is +. The
other two groups are identical between the source and target distribution, and their fractional mass
are given by py = pb = (1− pg)/2.
value of the algorithm A for each problem instance. It
is sufficient to define vA and vB . For simplicity, we
assume that the classifier obtained by training algo-
rithms A and B on a subset S ⊆ N is only a function
of the colors of the points in S; see Figure 1 for a full
specification of the assumed behaviours of A and B.
colors(S) A(S) B(S)
y, b, g fA fB
y, b fB fB
b, g f f
y, g h h
y h h
g h h
b h h
Table 1: Bottom to top: when there is only a
single color or when S consists of only yellow
and green points, then the entire training set
has the same label and we assume the output
is some dummy classifier h. When S consists
of blue and green points, both models output
the linear classifier f (yellow line). When S
consists of yellow and blue points, both models
output the linear classifier fB . Finally, when S
consists of all three colors, the linear model B
outputs fB whereas A outputs the non-linear
classifier fA.
The performance of the classifiers above depends on
the problem instance, which is defined by (py, pb, pg),
the fractional mass of the yellow, blue and green sub-
groups. The following table summarizes vA, vB ∈ G as
a function of these probabilities:
colors(S) vA(S) vB(S)
y, b, g 1− pg 1
y, b 1 1
b, g pb +
1
2py pb +
1
2py
y, g 0 0
y 0 0
g 0 0
b 0 0
Table 2: The performance of f is pb +
1
2py,
since on DT it correctly classifies the blue
points and half of the yellow points. The per-
formance of fA is 1 − pg, since it only errs
on the green points. Finally, the performance
of fB is 1.0 since it correctly classies all the
points.
